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NOTES
DID SHE ASK FOR IT?: THE "UNWELCOME"
REQUIREMENT IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
Title VII's promise of equality has not lived up to its potential.
Since Title VII's inception in 1964, courts have struggled to define
and analyze sex-based discrimination. Sexual harassment, which
53.1% of working women experience,I was not legally recognized as
discrimination until 1976.2 Until 1981, courts upheld sexual harass-
ment claims only when the plaintiff had suffered a tangible job detri-
ment. Women working in environments filled with sexually
degrading comments and behavior did not suffer legally cognizable
employment injuries and had no legal remedies. 3 By 1981, courts
had begun to recognize sexual harassment as the basis of a claim of
a "hostile or offensive work environment."'4 Finally, in 1986, the
Supreme Court firmly established the claim of "hostile environ-
ment" in Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson.5
To prove a hostile environment claim, plaintiffs must show that
the alleged harassment was "unwelcome." 6 In determining whether
conduct was "unwelcome," courts often admit evidence that is not
relevant. This judicial treatment of the unwelcome requirement
threatens to weaken the potentially powerful hostile environment
1 BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 46 (1985). Gutek studied 827 wo-
men and, among other questions, asked them "Have you ever experienced sexual har-
assment?" Id. at 45. The questionnaire did not provide a definition of sexual
harassment. Thus, the participants of the study defined harassment for themselves. In
an often cited study of federal employees, 42% of women reported being subjected to
some form of sexual harassment. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 36 (1981). "Research indicates
that the problem is quite pervasive. Estimates of the percentage of women who have
encountered sexual harassment in the workplace range from 42%o to 90%." David E.
Terpstra & Douglas A. Baker, A Hierarchy of Sexual Harassment, 121J. OF PSYCHOLOGY 599
(1987).
2 Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
3 The feminine pronoun will be used throughout this Note because women are the
primary victims of sexual harassment. Although men are sexually harassed in their em-
ployment, women are subjected to harassment much more frequently. U.S. MERIT SYS-
TEMS PROTECTION BOARD, supra note 1, at 3 (finding ten to fifteen percent of men
complain of homosexual overtures or sexual intimidation by female superiors).
4 Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
5 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.).
6 A plaintiff must prove she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment. See
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805
F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
1558
1992] THE "UNWELCOME" REQUIREMENT 1559
claim by subjecting it to outdated sexual stereotypes. Many courts
define discrimination based on gender roles from a male perspec-
tive.7 This male perspective influences many facets of sexual harass-
ment cases, including definitions of sexual harassment and
expectations of how harassed women behave, 8 and thus engenders
inequities in the legal system. These inequities must be reformed if
women are to achieve equality in the workplace.
To restore Title VII's potential to promote true equality for wo-
men in the workplace, "unwelcomeness" must be carefully defined
and the evidence admitted must be carefully regulated. The factors
courts presently consider in determining whether behavior was "un-
welcome" demonstrate a deeply rooted gender bias in the definition
of discrimination. These factors place the plaintiff's behavior on
trial9 and frustrate the purposes of Title VII.
7 See infra parts III and V.
8 The recent hearings surrounding the nomination of Associate Justice Clarence
Thomas provide a clear example of the influence of the male perspective. Professor
Anita Hill's testimony as to the alleged sexual harassment by Thomas engendered feel-
ings of outrage from some of the Senators: outrage over her behavior. Senators de-
manded to know how she could have been subjected to such behavior and not have
come forward. These questions vividly depicted the male perspective of how a woman
should react to harassing behavior.
For example, Senator Specter queried, "I know you decided not to make a com-
plaint but did you give that any consideration? And if so, how could you allow this kind
of reprehensible conduct to go on right in the headquarters without doing something
about it?" The Thomas Nomination: Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at A12. A befuddled Senator Orrin Hatch asked "How could
she (Hill) tolerate it?... How could she stand such behavior and not file a complaint?"
James Warren, Coverage Offers Class on Sexual Harassment, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 12,
1991, at Cl. Further, Senators used Hill's failure to file a complaint as proof of her lack
of veracity. See Jane E. Larson & Jonathan A. Knee, We Can Do Something About Sexual
Harassment, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1991, at A21.
Women seemed to understand and empathize with Anita Hill's reluctance to file a
complaint or go to the news media. For example, the editors of Ms. magazine expanded
the letters column in the January/February edition to provide room for expressions of
support and outrage. Letters, Ms., Jan./Feb. 1992, at 8-11. The media cited the "fierce
support that many Americans gave to Professor Hill . . ." and the "voices of women
across the land who told men that they did believe Anita Hill .... Larson & Knee,
supra, at A2 1; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Men Must See It With Women's Eyes, NEWSDAY, Oct. 10,
1991, at 147.
9 Hours of testimony in the Thomas hearings reflected the way in which Senators
placed Professor Hill on trial. Judge Thomas's supporters produced witnesses to im-
pugn Professor Hill's character, while Senators Specter and Hatch accused her of per-
jury. Derrick Z.Jackson, After the Thomas Affair, Progress-Or Silence?, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
20, 1991, at A37. Commentators suggested the absence of women on the Judiciary
Committee as a cause of this reprehensible behavior: "There is no doubt, many activists
say, that having more women in the Senate... almost certainly would have resulted in a
different process." Marlene Cimons, The Click! Heard 'Round the Nation, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
18, 1991, at El. "lThe 14Judiciary Committee members, all men, were insensitive to
women's experience and feelings." Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Wages of Cynicism,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at A31. In fact, the National Women's Political Caucus
placed ads "depicting Judge Clarence Thomas testifying before an all-female SenateJu-
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This Note examines the historical treatment of sexual harass-
ment under Title VII and the two Title VII claims currently available
to sexual harassment victims. The Note then focuses on the current
definitions of "unwelcome" and the sexism inherent in those defini-




Women in the 1990s face a radically different world than did
women in the 1950s. The feminist movement of the 1970s, the in-
creasing number of women in the workforce,' and the passage of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act"' have combined to afford
women greater opportunities to follow their chosen careers and at-
tain economic independence. Professions that were previously bas-
tions of male domination are now open to women.' 2 In light of
these successes, many women believe that they may claim victory
and enjoy the fruits of the long struggle.'5 Indeed, people argue
that further demands and continued struggle will bring about nega-
tive rather than positive results. 14 For some, the struggle is over;
the war has been won.
But victory cannot be claimed. While the number of women in
the workforce has increased, almost 61% of women are concen-
diciary Committee and asking 'What If?'" Hearing Fallout, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 1991, at
4A.
10 In 1940, 27.9% of women were in the labor force. In 1984, 53.7% of women
were in the labor force. FRANCINE D. BLAU & MARIANNE A. FERBER, THE ECONOMICS OF
WOMEN, MEN AND WORK 69 (1986).
l1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act states that it shall be an unlawful employment
practice to discriminate "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).
12 In 1970, 4.9% of lawyers, 9.7% of doctors, and 1.7% of engineers were women.
In 1980, 13.8% of lawyers, 13.4% of physicians and 4.6% of engineers were women.
BLAu & FERBER, supra note 10, at 160 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DETAILED OCCUPA-
TION OF THE EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BY SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES AND
REGIONS: 1980 AND 1970, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT PC80-sl-15 (March 1984)).
15 "Lately when I talk about gender, I am often confronted with the message that
women's equality has already been achieved. A colleague may provide this insight, or a
complete stranger waiting in a grocery line." Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1989). "To be a
woman in America at the close of the 20th century-what good fortune ... the barri-
cades have fallen, politicians assure us." SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED
WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN iX (1991).
14 "[Tlhe thought was most succinctly expressed by a student who grew impatient
with my activism. 'I don't understand,' she declared. 'Women have gotten just about
everything they wanted. Don't they see that the time for militancy is over?' " Abrams,
supra note 13, at 1184. "The women's movement, as we are told time and again, has
proved women's own worst enemy." FALUDI, supra note 13, at x.
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trated in traditional occupations.1 5 Women still earn only 64.8%o of
what men earn. 16 Women in the workforce must constantly fight
against the inequities of the male dominated infrastructure.1 7 Many
women find that the infrastructure of the business community is
based on male norms.18 Several feminist theorists argue that hierar-
chies of authority, designated positions, and the vertical structure of
authority-common elements of American working environments-
are elements based on the male perspective. 19
Power in the workplace is not equally distributed between men
and women. Men hold the vast majority of managerial and supervi-
sory positions. 20 This disproportionate distribution of power sug-
gests that men define the norms of the workplace, including what
constitutes acceptable behavior. On a deeper level, power and sex
are closely intertwined.21 In this way, the infrastructure of the work-
place involves both the tangible and the intangible. Thus, although
women cannot legally be excluded from the workplace on the basis
of gender, they are subject to the male-defined infrastructure of the
workplace, a condition that is often tantamount to exclusion. This
infrastructure, with its hierarchies, is a breeding ground for sexual
15 In 1984, 13.7% of all women in the labor force occupied sales positions, 28.9%
occupied administrative support positions, including clerical, and 18.4% occupied ser-
vice positions. Eleven percent of men are in sales, 5.6% are in administrative support,
including clerical, and 9.3% are in service occupations. BLAU & FERBER, supra note 10,
at 156 (citing DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS 27-28 (Dec. 1984) (Tables A-22, A-23).
16 BLAu & FERBER, supra note 10, at 171. This figure is based on the median weekly
earnings of full-time women workers for 1984.
17 By infrastructure, I mean the accepted norms of behavior, interaction, accepted
management styles and the usual hierarchy of authority.
18 See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WO-
MEN (1979).
19 "[Wlomen's culture offers the basis for a transformation of our society, a trans-
formation based on the womanly values of responsibility, connection, selflessness, and
caring, rather than on separation, autonomy and hierarchy .... [Fleminists characterize
traditional Western epistemology as 'male.'" Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MICH. L. REV. 798, 803 (1989).
Elements of the male perspective include intangibles "such as the 'appropriate' pro-
fessional demeanor: the tone of voice, air of command, and quickness to accommodate
or anger that mark a 'successful' employee. [The male perspective] also dictate[s] the
acceptable forms of professional camaraderie, and prescribe[s] the boundaries between
the workplace and the rest of the world." Abrams, supra note 13, at 1189.
In her study of male and female problem-solving behavior, Professor Carol Gilligan
elucidated some elements of these intangibles. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1982). In children as young as eight, boys tended to approach problem-solving
through an independent, rule structured approach, while girls focused on the relational,
contextual aspects of problems. Id. at 29.
20 BLAU & FERBER, supra note 10, at 161-65.
21 See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME I (1978). In
speaking of sexuality, Foucault stated that "[p]ower delineated it, aroused it, and em-
ployed it as the proliferating meaning that had always to be taken control of again lest it
escape .... " Id. at 148.
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harassment. "Sexual harassment has also emerged as a creature of
hierarchy. It inhabits what I call hierarchies among men .... 22
Other subtle forms of discrimination keep many women from
playing a full role in the workforce.23 Catcalls, offensive and de-
grading language, unwelcome physical contact of a sexual nature,
and unwanted invitations for dates or sexual conduct all serve to




HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER
TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes unlawful any
discrimination "against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 25
Originally, Title VII was not intended to remedy sexual harassment.
In fact, "sex" was added to Title VII as a last minute amendment to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 After Congress enacted Title VII,
22 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 103, 107 (1987).
23 "Many employees and supervisors persisted in treating women in a
demeaning or sexual way. Some women were required to wear sexually
provocative uniforms on the job. Others heard themselves addressed by
diminutives that undercut their credibility in responsible positions. They
became the object of lewd comments and jokes, and sometimes were pro-
positioned by colleagues or supervisors."
Abrams, supra note 13, at 1187. "Thirty-eight percent of women said the [harassment]
affected their feelings about their jobs and twenty-eight percent said it affected how they
relate to other people at work.... The two strongest reactions were disgust and anger."
GtrrEK, supra note 1, at 70-71.
24 See generally MACKINNON, supra note 18.
Sexual harassment on the job undercuts a woman's autonomy
outside the home by sexualizing her role in exactly the same way as
within the family: sexual imposition combined with a definition of her
work in terms of tasks which serve the man, sanctioned by her own practi-
cal inability to create the material conditions of her life on her own.
Id. at 216-17.
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).
26 "The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at
the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives ... [and thus,] we are left
with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against
discrimination based on 'sex.'" Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986).
The amendment was proposed by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, Chairman
of the House Rules Committee. Some commentators believe the prohibition against
discrimination based on sex was added as an attempt to defeat the entire bill. "[The
inclusion of 'sex'] was offered as an addition to other proscriptions by opponents in a
last-minute attempt to block the bill which became the Act ...." Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Representative Smith's plan failed. "One of the most
powerful remedies for sex discrimination available today owes its origin to a misfired
1562 [V.ol. 77:1558
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courts struggled to determine how to apply Title VII to cases of sex-
ual discrimination. 27 It was thirteen years before a court finally used
Title VII to remedy sexual harassment.
28
One of the key elements of a Title VII case is proof that the
discriminatory action took place "because of" the employee's sex,
race, religion, etc.2 9 This standard has been described as the "but
for" test-it is met when the action would not have taken place but
for the employee's gender, race, religion, etc. In applying the "be-
cause of" or "but for" standard, courts examine the action taken by
the employer and determine whether an employee of another gen-
der would have been treated in the same way. If the action would
not have occurred with an employee of the other gender, there is a
presumption of discrimination."0 In some early decisions, courts
did not consider sexual harassment to be equivalent to discrimina-
tion, since it did not occur "because of" the employee's sex.
3 1
These courts found that the harassment was due to the interper-
sonal relationship between supervisor and employee.3 2 In other
words, the specific characteristics of the employee triggered the har-
assment: Jane Doe was harassed because she was Jane Doe, not be-
cause she was a woman.
In the late 1970s, however, courts began to include sexual har-
assment in the definition of discrimination.3 3 In 1976, the U.S.
political tactic on the part of opponents of the Act." J. RALPH LINDGREN & NADINE TAUB,
THE LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 110-11 (1988).
27 See, e.g., Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp 161 (D. Ariz. 1975) (hold-
ing that sexual advances are not discrimination because Title VII reaches only discrimi-
nation that arises out of company policy), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (without
opinion).
28 See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (su-
pervisor's demand for sexual relations violated Title VII).
29 Tite VII states that "it shall be unlawful employment practice to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991) (emphasis added); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (11 h Cir. 1982) ("[T]he plaintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex, she
would not have been the object of harassment.").
30 "If an employee is discharged under circumstances in which an employee of an-
other sex would not have been discharged, an inference of discrimination arises ..
EEOC v. Brown & Root, Inc., 688 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1982).
31 See Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (finding
that the conduct was "nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or manner-
ism" of the supervisor), vacated on other grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v.
Costle, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1975) (the conduct amounted
to "the subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship."), rev'd, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
32 See supra note 31 (discussing these cases).
3 See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (Title
VII violated when supervisor conditions employee's job status on favorable response to
his sexual advances); Heelan v.Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978)
(Title VII violated when supervisor conditions employee's job status on favorable re-
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Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that a violation of Title
VII had occurred when a supervisor dismissed an employee because
she refused his requests for sexual relations.3 4 The court held that
this sexual harassment was a type of discrimination based on sex,
and was therefore actionable under Title VII.3 5 Similarly, in 1977,
the Third Circuit upheld a claim for sexual harassment under Title
VII in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. 3 6 The court found
that a supervisor's demand for sexual relations, ostensibly to foster
a satisfactory working relationship, affected a "term or condition" of
employment and therefore was a violation of Title VII.37 Later,
courts began to recognize unwelcome sexual attention as a claim
under Title VII.38 By the early 1980s, sexual harassment was fully
accepted as a claim under Title VII.39
III
CURRENT CLAIMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER
TITLE VII
Under Title VII an employee may sue her employer 4° for un-
lawful employment practices, such as discrimination on the basis of
gender.4' The sexual discrimination or harassment need not be
conduct on the part of the employer: Title VII applies both to su-
sponse to his sexual advances); see also Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp.
459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd,
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976);
Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (compelling female
employees to submit to the sexual advances of supervisors violates Title VII).
34 Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 654.
35 Id. at 658.
36 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
37 Id. at 1046-47.
38 See infra note 54.
39 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that sexual
harassment can create a hostile environment and therefore a violation of Title VII, re-
gardless of the absence of tangible job detriments); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding Title VII violated by insults and demeaning propositions that
sexually stereotyped the plaintiff); Robson v. Eva's Super Mkt., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857
(N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that an employee who received tasks more onerous than
normal without receiving additional pay after rejecting her supervisor's advances could
state a Title VII cause of action).
40 An employer includes "any person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1991).
41 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1991).
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pervisors42 and to the work environment created by fellow employ-
ees.43 To bring a Title VII claim, the aggrieved employee must first
file notice of the charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC").4 4 If the EEOC believes the charge has
merit, it must then attempt to alleviate the situation through infor-
mal procedures. 45 If the informal mediation is unsuccessful, or at
the request of aggrieved party, the EEOC will grant a "right to sue"
letter.46 The "right to sue" letter commences the suit in federal
court. Until very recently, Title VII excluded awards of punitive or
compensatory damages.47 With the availability of such damages,
either party in a Title VII suit may request a jury trial. 48
Courts interpret Title VII to include two different claims based
on sexual harassment: quid pro quo claims and hostile environment
claims.49 These will be addressed in turn.
A. Quid Pro Quo
Quid pro quo harassment involves a grant or denial of eco-
nomic benefits following the employee's response to "unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] other verbal or
42 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (finding Title VII violated
when supervisor engaged in unwanted sexual conduct with an employee).
43 See Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding Title VII vio-
lated when co-employee subjected plaintiff to unwanted sexual comments and physical
touching); see infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Swentek
decision).
44 A complainant must file charges with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred. If, however, the aggrieved employee had ini-
tially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency, the employee must file charges
with the EEOC within 300 days of the incident or within 30 days after receiving notice of
the termination of the state proceedings, whichever is earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 20OO0e-5(e)
(1991).
45 If the Commission determines that "there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."
42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(b) (1991).
46 The Commission may bring a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1991)
or, if the Commission takes no action, the aggrieved employee may institute a civil ac-
tion no later than ninety days after receiving notice that the Commission is not bringing
charges. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1991).
47 Relief under Title VII can include declaratory or injunctive relief, reinstatement,
back pay, attorney's fees, and affirmative action plans. See 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-5(g)
(1991). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to allow successful plaintiffs to
recover punitive damage awards from $50,000 to $300,000. 102 P.L. 166 § 102(b). See
also Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (upholding
the award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)).
48 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166 § 102(c) (1991).
49 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872 (9th Cir. 1991); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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physical conduct of a sexual nature."'50 A clear example of the basis
for such a claim is a fact pattern that amounts to "sleep with me or
I'll fire you." In establishing a quid pro quo claim, the plaintiff must
show that "tangible job benefits are conditioned on an employee's
submission to conduct of a sexual nature and that adverse job con-
sequences result from the employee's refusal to submit to the con-
duct."'5 These job benefits may include transfers, promotions,
favorable evaluations, pay raises, and continued employment.
52
The quid pro quo claim arises only when the plaintiff shows a
link between the job detriment and a refusal to submit to a supervi-
sor's sexual advances. 53 For years, Title VII did not address the
claims of women who experienced unwanted or unilateral sexual at-
tention or advances without any tangible job detriment. In the early
1980s, however, courts begin to acknowledge the claim of a hostile
working environment.
54
B. Hostile or Abusive Working Environment
A hostile working environment claim arises in situations in
which an employee must endure verbal or physical abuse as part of
her employment but does not suffer a tangible job detriment. A
hostile environment arising out of gender discrimination can be cre-
ated by conduct that degrades or devalues women, 55 or simply by
50 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985). Courts have granted the administrative guide-
lines issued by the enforcing agancy great deference. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5' Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987).
52 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977).
53 The link between the supervisor's sexual advances and the effect on the job ben-
efit does not have to run between the supervisor and the plaintiff. In Broderick v. Ruder,
685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988), the court granted recovery in a claim based on a
hostile environment created by supervisors bestowing preferential treatment on women
who submitted to their sexual advances.
[S]uch conduct created a hostile or offensive work environment which
affected the motivation and work performance of those who found such
conduct repugnant and offensive .... [P]laintiff and other women...
found the sexual conduct and its accompanying manifestations which
[the] managers engaged in over a protracted period of time to be
offensive.
Id. at 1278. This hostile atmosphere forced women to be sexually responsive to their
supervisors in order to gain job benefits, and therefore constituted sexual harassment.
Id. at 1276-77.
54 Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F.
Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981); Brown v. City of Guthrie, Okla., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
55 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1209. Professor Abrams advocates a definition of hos-
tile environment that focuses on the response of the plaintiff to the conduct: "The
plaintiff's description of the defendant's sexually oriented behavior and of the feelings




harmful conduct that would not occur but for the sex of the em-
ployee.56 If a supervisor continually pinches and grabs an employee
but never hinges a promotion or raise on reciprocity, a quid pro quo
claim would not succeed. The employee would, however, have a
hostile environment claim.
1. The Origins of the Hostile Environment Claim
The hostile environment claim originated in a case involving
discrimination based on national origin. In Rogers v. EEOC,57 a His-
panic employee sued her employer for creating a discriminatory en-
vironment through his discriminatory practices toward Hispanic
clients. The Fifth Circuit held that Title VII covered psychological
as well as economic harm, 8 and a discriminatory work environment
could therefore constitute a violation of Title VII.59
Hostile environment cases based on race or national origin 60 do
not prescribe a specific set of facts that the plaintiff must prove in
order to recover.61 Generally, however, courts require the existence
of a pattern of racial or ethnic slurs, interference with job perform-
ance, and managerial inaction.
62
56 For example, such harmful conduct could include nonsexual verbal harassment
and less favorable work assignments delegated only to female employees. See McKinney
v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("We have never held that sexual harass-
ment ... of an employee or group of employees that occurs because of the sex of an
employee must, to be illegal under Title VII, take the form of sexual advances or of
other incidents with clearly sexual overtones."); see also Hall v. Gus Const. Co., 842 F.2d
1010 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that repeated verbal comments of a sexual and nonsexual
nature were found to have been properly considered); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833
F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that nonsexual verbal harassment of a black female
security guard mandated consideration on the question of sexual harassment).
57 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
58 Id. at 238.
59 "'The terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' is an expansive
concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating
a work environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimina-
tion.... One can readily envision working environments so heavily pol-
luted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers.'"
Id. at 239.
60 See Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977) (holding that segregated dining facilities violate
Title VII); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that a racially hostile
work environment adversely affects a term, condition or privilege of employment, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
61 Most courts do not use the same test for sexual harassment as for racial harass-
ment. The "unwelcome" requirement does not exist in racial harassment cases. It is
assumed that a pattern of racial slurs is unwelcome and that "racial conduct does not
serve any purpose in our society." See Lisa Rhodes, Note, The Sixth Circuit's Double Stan-
dard in Hostile Work Environment Claims: Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345
(6th Cir. 1988), 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 779, 812 (1989); see also infra part III.B.2. (discussing




2. Hostile Environment Claims Arising From Sexual Harassment
After the recognition of a hostile environment claim based on
race, some courts began to extend the reasoning to sexual harass-
ment claims. For instance, in Bundy v. Jackson,63 the D.C. Circuit de-
termined that the Title VII harassment analysis used in cases of
discrimination based on race, religion or ethnicity also applies to
claims of discrimination based on sex.64 Throughout six years of
employment, Bundy continually received sexual propositions from
co-workers and, in the last two years of her employment, from two
of her supervisors. 65 When she complained of the harassment to
the harassers' supervisor, she was told "'any man in his right mind
would want to rape you.' "66
The D.C. Circuit held that a violation of Title VII could occur
"where an employer created or condoned a substantially discrimina-
tory work environment, regardless of whether the complaining em-
ployees lost any tangible job benefits as a result of the
discrimination. ' 67 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would
enable employers, by stopping short of taking any tangible action,
to harass women "with impunity." 68 The court thus expanded the
meaning of the phrase "conditions of employment" to include the
"psychological and emotional work environment." 69
In Henson v. City of Dundee,70 the Eleventh Circuit further devel-
oped the hostile environment doctrine. Henson worked as a dis-
patcher for the Dundee Police Department. The Police Chief
subjected Henson and another female employee to "numerous
harangues of demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities" 7' and re-
peated requests for sexual relations. The Henson court rejected the
defendants' argument that a tangible job detriment must exist for an
employee to state a legally cognizable Title VII sexual harassment
claim. Citing cases involving racially discriminatory environ-
ments,7 2 the court held that "under certain circumstances, the crea-
63 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
64 The court cited extensively Judge Goldberg's opinion in Rogers. See id at 944; see
also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing Rogers).
65 Bundy, 641 F.2d at 939.
66 Id. at 940 (quoting Findings of Fact No. 37, App. 14).
67 Id. at 943-44.
68 Id. at 945.
69 Id. at 944.
70 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
71 Id. at 899.
72 See Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977) (holding that segregated dining facilities cre-
ate a discriminatory work environment); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (holding that employee's work environment is
protected under Title VII under the phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
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tion of an offensive or hostile work environment due to sexual
harassment can violate Title VII irrespective of whether the com-
plainant suffers a tangible job detriment. 73 The court found that
Title VII protects women, as well as men, from having to run "a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed
to work."
' 74
3. The Five Necessary Elements of a Hostile Environment Claim
Under Henson
The Henson court listed five elements that a claimant must es-
tablish to succeed on a hostile environment claim:75 (1) that the em-
ployee belongs to a protected group;76 (2) that the employee was
subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, including sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature; (3) that the harassment complained of was based on
gender;77 (4) that the harassment complained of affected a "term,
condition or privilege" of employment; and (5) respondeat
superior.78
ment"); Lucero v. Beth Israel Hosp. and Geriatric Ctr., 479 F. Supp. 452,454 (D. Colo.
1979) (finding that a pattern of racial slurs had created discriminatory work environ-
ment); Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 231, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1976)
(holding that racial harassment of white employee created discriminatory working condi-
tions), aff'd, 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978).
73 Henson, 682 F.2d at 901.
74 Id. at 902.
75 Id. at 903-05. Some courts have applied this sexual harassment analysis to cases
involving racial or national origin harassment. See Taylor v.Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199
(8th Cir. 1981) (recognizing a Title VII claim based on a racially hostile environment
under the Bundy analysis); Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984)
(holding that the Henson analysis provided a basis for a Title VII action permitted a
pattern of anti-Semitic verbal abuse). For commentary on these cases, see CATHARINE A.
MAcKINNON, Sexual Harassment, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 22, at 256 n.46
(1986) (citing the above cases approvingly).
76 "As in other cases of sexual discrimination, this requires a simple stipulation that
the employee is a man or a woman." Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
77 See supra notes 30-32, accompanying text (discussing the nature of conduct in
hostile environment cases).
78 Henson, 682 F.2d at 905. Many articles and commentaries have thoughtfully ad-
dressed the problem of proving employer liability. See generally Joseph G. Allegretti, Sex-
ual Harassment by Nonemployees: The Limits of Employer Liability, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 98
(1983); Cynthia F. Cohen &Joyce P. Vincelette, Notice, Remedy, and Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment, 35 LAB. LJ. 301 (1984); Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liabil-
ity Under Title VII for Sexual Harassment after Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1258 (1987);
David J. Burge, Note, Employment Discrimination-Defining an Employer's Liability under Title
VII for On-the-Job Sexual Harassment: Adoption of a Bifurcated Standard, 62 N.C. L. REV. 795
(1984); Nancy F. Chudacoff, Comment, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment under Title VII, 61 B.U. L. REV. 535 (1981);
Sheryl A. Greene, Note, Reevaluation of Title VII Abusive Environment Claims After Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 13 MARSHALL L. REV. 29 (1988); Lucy B. Longstreth, Note,
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment. A Wrong Without a Remedy ?-Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 811 (1987); Christine 0. Merriman & Cora G. Yang,
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Under the Henson test, the plaintiff, after alleging that she is a
woman or a member of a protected group, must allege that she was
subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.7 9 Although the term
"harassment" implies unwelcomeness, 80 the plaintiff must neverthe-
less affirmatively prove that the conduct was "unwelcome." 8' The
Henson court defined as "unwelcome" behavior that the plaintiff did
not solicit or incite and that the plaintiff found "undesirable or of-
fensive."'8 2 The plaintiff then must show that, but for the fact of her
gender, the harassment would not have occurred.83 A male supervi-
sor's overtures to a female employee satisfy this criterion.8 4 The
gender-based harassment must be "sufficiently pervasive so as to al-
ter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working en-
vironment.'85 A single instance of harassment, such as one
comment or action, is not significant enough to create a hostile
environment.8 6
Finally, the plaintiff must show respondeat superior.87 Under
Henson, the plaintiff must establish "that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take
prompt remedial action."88 A complaint by the plaintiff to higher
management indicates employer knowledge of the harassment. If
Note, Employer Liability For Co-worker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 83 (1984-85); Michael D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms of Asking: Towards a
Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 328 (1988).
79 See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1981)).
80 Black's Law Dictionary defines harassment as "words, gestures and actions which
tend to annoy, alarm and abuse (verbally) another person." BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY
645 (5th ed. 1979). Harassment has also been defined as "to annoy persistently." WEB-
STER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTrIONARY 522 (Henry B. Woolf, ed., 8th ed., 1973).
81 Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. See infra part IV (criticizing the unwelcomeness test).
82 Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. See infra part VI (discussing incitement as a test of
unwelcomeness).
83 Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-04. See supra part II (discussing the "because of"
requirement).
84 "In the typical case in which a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to a fe-
male worker, it is obvious that the supervisor did not treat male employees in a similar
fashion." Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. Despite the Henson court's claim that overtures by a
male supervisor to a female employee "obviously" satisfied the test, the courts reason-
ing actually creates a "bisexual" defense when the supervisor has made overtures to
men and women, thereby negating a showing of "but for" cause.
85 Id.
86 "The mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive
feelings in an employee does not affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment to a sufficiently significant degree." Id. (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238
(5th Cir. 1971)).
87 Id. at 905; see supra note 76.
88 Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
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the conduct is extremely pervasive, a court may attribute construc-
tive knowledge to the employer.8 9
With little variation, the Henson five-part test remains the pri-
mary test for establishing sexual harassment under Title VII.90
Among the circuit courts, only the Third and Ninth Circuits have
adopted other standards. The Third Circuit, in Drinkwater v. Union
Carbide Corp,9 1set forth a different five-part analysis for hostile envi-
ronment claims. Under Drinkwater, the plaintiff must show: (1) in-
tentional discrimination because of gender; (2) that the
discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) that the discrimination
detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) that the discrimination would
detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that posi-
tion; and (5) respondeat superior.9 2 The Third Circuit did not re-
quire unwelcomeness, focusing instead on the objective and
subjective effect the discrimination has on the plaintiff.
The Ninth Circuit adopted a method of analysis different from
either of these five-part tests.93 In Ellison v. Brady,94 the plaintiff
turned down several requests for dates from a co-worker. She then
received several letters from him indicating his belief in the exis-
tence of a relationship between them.95 The Ninth Circuit essen-
tially allowed the plaintiff to define the harassment:96 "We . . .
89 Id. The employee can "demonstrate that the employer knew of the harassment
by showing... the pervasiveness of the harassment, which gives rise to the inference of
knowledge or constructive knowledge." Id.
90 The most recent Tenth Circuit decisions in sexual harassment cases do not ex-
plicitly require a showing of "unwelcomeness." See Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Correc-
tions Dep't, 916 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990); Ramsey v. City and County of Denver, 907
F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1990). However, both cases quote Henson and Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), for definitions of sexual harassment. Both Meitor and Hen-
son require a finding that the conduct was unwelcome. See infra part VI.
The other circuits (discussing Meitor) follow Henson's five-part test. See Trautvetter
v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1990); Dabish v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 902 F.2d 32
(6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished decision) (requiring a showing of "unwelcome" conduct
but not explicitly citing Henson); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir.
1990); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Wyerick v.
Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1989); Staton v. Maries County, 868 F.2d
996 (8th Cir. 1989); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988);
Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
91 904 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1990).
92 Id. at 860 (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir.
1990)).
93 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
94 Id.
95 The letters included statements such as "I cried over you last night and I'm to-
tally drained today," and "I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months.
Watching you." Id. at 874.
96 Id. at 878 ("[W]e believe that in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sex-
ual harassment, we should focus on the perspective of the victim."). Id.
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prefer to analyze harassment from the victim's perspective. ' 97
Under this methodology, the plaintiff can prove a prima facie case of
hostile environment by showing "conduct which a reasonable
woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment."98 This method of analysis does not require proof of un-
welcomeness and allows recovery even if the alleged harasser did
not intend to discriminate based on the plaintiff's gender.99
4. The Supreme Court's Acceptance of the Hostile Environment Claim
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
The Supreme Court recognized hostile environment as a Title
VII claim in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 100 Out of fear of losing
her job, Vinson engaged in sexual relations with her supervisor and
was subjected to various other sexual encounters. 10' Some time af-
ter sexual relations between the two ended, she was fired for exces-
sive use of sick time. Citing EEOC guidelines, the Court held that
"Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimina-
tion,"'10 2 and that "Title VII affords employees the right to work in
an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult."' 03 The Court also stated that "a plaintiff may establish a
violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex
has created a hostile or abusive working environment."' 10 4
Vinson's employer, Meritor Savings Bank, argued that existed
no harassment because Vinson "voluntarily" engaged in sexual in-
tercourse with her supervisor. 10 5 The district court accepted the
Bank's argument and held that because the relationship was volun-
tary no cause of action existed under Title VII. 10 6 The Supreme
Court rejected the district court's assessment of the voluntariness
issue. 10 7 Instead, the Court asserted that "[t]he gravamen of any
97 Id. at 878.
98 Id. at 879.
99 "Well-intentioned compliments by co-workers or supervisors can form the basis
of a sexual harassment cause of action ... because Title VII is not a fault-based tort
scheme." Id. at 880.
100 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
101 Vinson alleged that her supervisor made repeated demands for sexual favors,
fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's restroom, ex-
posed himself, and forcibly raped her. Id. at 60.
102 Id. at 64.
103 Id. at 65.
104 Id. at 66.
105 Id. at 68.
106 Vinson v. Taylor, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,708, at 14,692 (1985).
107 "[T]he fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary' in the sense that the com-
plainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harass-
ment suit .... Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
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sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome.' "108 By focusing on the "unwelcome" issue, an em-
ployee can claim sexual harassment for conduct she neither invited
nor appreciated.
The Court, however, reversed the court of appeals' finding that
evidence of Vinson's "dress and personal fantasies"' 109 were not ad-
missible. "[Ilt does not follow that a complainant's sexually provoc-
ative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining
whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome."110
The Supreme Court declined to rule on the potential prejudicial ef-
fect of this evidence, instead leaving that decision to the district
court." I
Furthermore, the Court held that not all harassing conduct falls
within Title VII. The harassment complained of must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employ-
ment."1 12 The Court did not elaborate on this requirement but
stated that Vinson's "allegations ... are plainly sufficient to state a
claim for 'hostile environment' sexual harassment."' 1 3
Meritor potentially represents a significant step forward for wo-
men in securing workplaces free of sexual harassment.' 14 However,
the decision also undermines that progress because, although the
Court requires a showing that the conduct was unwelcome, it also
allows evidence of the plaintiff's speech and dress 1 5 in determining
"welcomeness." This latter requirement allows judges and juries to
108 Id. at 68.
109 753 F.2d 141, 146 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
110 477 U.S. at 69.
I1I Id.
112 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982))
(alteration in original).
"13 Id.
114 Despite this great potential, some commentators criticized the Meritor decision
for creating more confusion than clarity. See MACKINNON, supra note 22, at 105 ("[I]t
may be too soon to know whether the law against sexual harassment will be taken away
from us or turn into nothing or turn ugly in our hands."); Theodore F. Claypoole, Note,
Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law: The Need for Sexual Harassment Legislation, 48 OHIO ST. LJ.
1151, 1151 (1987) ("Instead of clarifying the developing sexual harassment law, the
Mentor decision raised as many questions as it answered.").
115 While the Court's decision specifically mentioned "speech and dress," this Note
will focus on the dress and personality of the victim without addressing the specific con-
tent of the speech. To address adequately the standards surrounding speech would in-
volve a lengthy discussion of First Amendment doctrine, especially the recent "hate
speech" developments. For a discussion of such issues, see Mari J. Matsuda, Public Re-
sponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
For articles specifically addressing the conflict between Title VII and free speech,
see March Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1990);
Symposium, Free Speech and Religious, Racial and Sexual Harassment, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 207 (1991); Ellen E. Lange, Note, Racist Speech on Campus: A Title VII Solution to a
First Amendment Problem, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 105 (1990).
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consider outmoded stereotypes and beliefs in their analysis of hos-
tile environment claims."i 6 The requirement of unwelcomeness,
along with consideration of the plaintiff's speech and dress, will
continue to exclude women from the workplace and will hinder ef-
forts to achieve equality. The remainder of this Note focuses on the
Court's requirement that the conduct be "unwelcome," and shows




In Meitor, the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he gravamen of
any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome.' "117 While attempting to remove any requirement of
involuntariness," 18 the Court added an additional hurdle over which
plaintiffs must leap. In addition to showing that the alleged conduct
actually did occur, plaintiffs must show that they did not welcome
the conduct. 119
One author suggests that the "unwelcome" requirement in the
plaintiff's prima facie case is a departure from the ordinary require-
ments of Title VII law.120 Usually, a Title VII plaintiff must demon-
strate that she is a member of a protected group and that some
discriminatory action was taken against her.12' The employer may
rebut the prima facie case by showing a nondiscriminatory reason
for the action.' 22 The employee must then prove that the nondis-
criminatory reason is pretextual. 123 "[M]ost areas of the law do not
require a victim to anticipate her antagonist's defenses in her prima
facie case, and Title VII is no exception."' 24 The concept of "wel-
116 See infra part VI (discussing the tests for unwelcomeness).
117 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
118 See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
119 "Defining sexual harassment as unwanted sexual overtures has the same prob-
lem inherent in defining rape as unwanted sexual relations. In practice, the woman has
to prove that the sexual relations or the sexual overtures were unwanted." GUTEK, supra
note 1, at 17.
120 Vhay, supra note 78, at 344.
121 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas
involved a claim of a racially motivated discharge. The Court held that the complainant
could establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) that he is a member of a racial minor-
ity; (2) that he applied and was qualified for the open job position; (3) that he was re-
jected despite his qualifications; and (4) that the position remained open after his
rejection and that the employer continued to seek applicants from people with the same
qualifications. Id. at 802.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 804.
124 Vhay, supra note 78, at 344. But see Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,
621 (6th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas procedures to a
hostile environment case, stating that "the order of proof and procedures enunciated [in
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comeness" is almost identical to an employer's defense of
consent. 12
5
The justifications offered for "unwelcome" requirement
demonstrate a reliance on outdated stereotypes. Concerned about
the potential for abuse, the EEOC, in its Meritor amicus brief, argued
for a "welcomeness" standard. The EEOC stated that welcomeness
is needed to "ensure that sexual harassment charges do not become
a tool by which one party to a consensual sexual relationship may
punish the other." 126 The concern that women will abuse the legal
system to punish others is a familiar concept in legal history. 127
Such an unjustifiable belief should not be allowed to skew discrimi-
nation law towards defendants.
Another problem with the unwelcomeness requirement is the
practical difficulty of ascertaining whether the conduct was truly wel-
comed.12 A victim may silently accept such harassment because she
fears retaliation, yet courts may erroneously consider a victim's si-
lence as consent. "The legal requirement of notice can conflict with
the dynamics of power present in the workplace."' 29 Therefore,
definitions of welcomeness should look to see whether there was
true consent or acquiescence.
In sum, the "unwelcomeness" requirement reformulates the
structure of proof normally found in Title VII cases and does not
adequately account for the power dynamics of the workplace. De-
spite these inadequacies, courts continue to use this standard and
have fashioned a variety of tests to determine unwelcomeness.' 30
McDonnell Douglas is] not readily adaptable to developing the proofs and defenses in this
type of Title VII action."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
125 See Vhay, supra note 78, at 344 ("Welcomeness in this context is most analogous
to a justification for the defendant's act .....
126 Brief for EEOC, Meritor (No. 84-1979).
127 Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale's now infamous statement concerning rape
charges provides a succinct statement of this view: "[Rape is a charge] easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho' never so
innocent." SusAN EsTRcH, REAL RAPE 6 (1987) (quoting Sir Matthew Hale, The History
of the Pleas of the Crown, 1 (1971)). For a summary of the historical distrust of women
victims, see EsTRcH, supra, at 27-79.
Consider also the characterizations of Professor Hill during the Thomas hearings as
a "scorned woman." " My impression was that Anita wished to have a greater relation-
ship with the chairman than just a professional one .... [She] was hurt because he
treated herjust like he treated everybody else ....... Adam Clymer, The Thomas Nomina-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at Al.
128 MaryJo Shaney, Note, Perceptions of Harms: The Consent Defense in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 71 IowA L. REV. 1109 (1986). The author advocates a standard that determines
whether the victim of the harassment overtly indicated consent and examines the con-
text of the consent to see if it was freely given.
129 Id. at 1119. See supra notes 10-24 and accompanying text (explaining the struc-
ture of the workplace which allows men to hold such power of retaliation over women).




THE ANALOGY TO RAPE SHIELD LAWS
In deciding if conduct is "unwelcome," courts and juries essen-
tially determine whether the victim "asked for it." The factors con-
sidered bear a striking resemblance to factors formerly considered
in rape cases. In the past, a victim of rape had to explain her dress
(miniskirts, tight pants, etc.), her behavior (walking alone late at
night), and her past sexual conduct. Indeed, cross-examinations of
victims were frequently so intrusive that complainants often felt vic-
timized again.1
3'
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence contain procedures to
exclude irrelevant, prejudicial evidence in rape and sexual harass-
ment cases,13 2 courts did not apply the rules to protect rape victims
adequately. To remedy this, Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 412 to "spare victims of rape the degrading and unwarranted
intrusions into intimate details of their private lives that had for-
merly been common practice in the federal courts."' 33
Rule 412134 is based on the belief that sexual history evidence is
logically irrelevant: it does not make more or less probable the exis-
tence of any material fact.' 35 Although such evidence might pass
the low threshold of "any tendency," stereotypes and sexist assump-
tions create a large risk that the jury will misuse such evidence. In-
131 Catherine O'Neill, Note, Sexual Harassment Cases and the Law of Evidence: A Proposed
Rule, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 219, 230 (citing 124 Cong. Rec. H 34,913 (1978)).
132 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows for the exclusion of any evidence where the
potential prejudice outweighs the probative value of such evidence. See infra part VII
(discussing Rule 403).
133 O'Neill, supra note 131, at 230.
134 The relevant part of Rule 412 is as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of an offense under chapter 109A of title 18,
United States Code, reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual
behavior of an alleged victim of such offense is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of an offense under chapter 109A of title 18,
United States Code, evidence of a victims past sexual behavior other than
reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such evi-
dence other than reputation or opinion evidence is-
(1) ... is constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence
of-
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the ac-
cused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether
the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged vic-
tim, the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by
the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim
consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which
such offense is alleged.
135 Id. at 224.
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formation is often withheld from the jury on the belief they might
misuse it.136 Congress, in enacting Rule 412, sought to reinforce
"the evidentiary rules so as to avoid the juror's consideration of in-
formation which has the great potential to influence the outcome in
impermissible ways." 1 37 Thus, Rule 412 provides a practical exam-
ple of the fashioning of specific evidentiary rules to exclude evi-
dence when the courts seem unwilling to do so.
Rule 412 provides a basis to argue against the introduction of
prior sexual history evidence in sexual harassment cases.
1 38
Although Rule 412 explicitly applies to criminal cases, the leap to
civil cases is not a large one. In a rape case, discovery and introduc-
tion of evidence is limited to protect victims, although "the defen-
dant can potentially lose his liberty." 139 Sexual harassment cases
involve equally important considerations: "the civil rights of the vic-
tims are involved."1 40 Further, in sexual harassment cases, the de-
fendant is not subject to prison, only money damages. Hence, it
would be possible to create an analogue to Rule 412 for sexual har-
assment cases. However, a mere analogue to Rule 412 would not
reach far enough. 14 1 Rule 412 does not end the "did she ask for it"
inquiry. A victim's speech and dress are still relevant in rape cases
under the current Rules. 142 Similarly, an imputation of Rule 412 to
sexual harassment cases is not a solution-the "unwelcomeness" re-
quirement would still remain.
VI
THE TESTS FOR UNWELCOMENESS
In many sexual harassment cases, the courts merely state that
the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment without
explaining how they reached this finding. 143 In some cases, the
136 Id. at 229 (citing FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's notes).
137 Id. at 230.
138 See id. (proposing a rule similar to Rule 412 in sexual harassment cases); see also
Susan R. Klein, Comment, A Survey of Evidence and Discovery Rules in Civil Sexual Harassment
Suits with Special Emphasis on California Law, 11 INDUS. REL. LJ. 540 (1989).
139 Klein, supra note 138, at 574.
140 Id.
141 It should be noted that Rule 412 applies only to federal cases. There is no fed-
eral crime of rape. "[R]ape prosecutions in federal court are few and far between."
ABRAHAM ORDOVER & FAUST Rossi, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 87 (1991). One
notable exception is crimes, including rape, committed on American Indian reservations
in which all crimes are heard in federal court.
142 Rule 412 does not mention speech or dress. See supra note 134.
143 See Wheeler v. Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 1246, 1249 (6th Cir. 1989) ("It is un-
contested that [the plaintiff] was the victim of sexual harassment."); Pease v. Alford
Photo Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) ("The preponderance of
the evidence is that this sexually harassing conduct by [the supervisor] was unwelcomed,
unwanted, unconsented to and humiliating .... ); Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561
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statement of a clear and unequivocal "no" or physical resistance by
the plaintiff, may have obviated the need for a discussion of the evi-
dence of "unwelcomeness."' 144 In many other cases, however, the
criterion of welcomeness remains an important issue. Courts have
relied on a number of different tests.
145
A. The "Totality of the Circumstances" Test
1. Origin and Judicial Interpretations of the Test
In 1985, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re-
leased guidelines on sexual harassment, suggesting that the trier of
fact should determine whether sexual harassment occurred in light
of the "record as a whole" and the "totality of the circumstances,
such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which
the alleged incidents occurred."
146
The Supreme Court, in Meritor v. Vinson, 147 cited with approval
the EEOC Guidelines for determining what evidence was relevant to
the issue of welcomeness: "The EEOC Guidelines emphasize that
the trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual harassment
in light of 'the record as a whole' and 'the totality of the circum-
stances .... -148 Following Meitor, many courts adopted the
F. Supp. 645, 647 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ("I find that the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment ... ").
144 See Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 371 (W.D.N.C. 1988) ("Plain-
tiff resisted this advance and broke away from [the defendant's] grip."); Carrero v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 668 F. Supp. 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (The plaintiff told the
defendant that "she wanted him to stop his conduct and showed [him] a notice of a
conference which related to her then pending charge of harassment [against another
supervisor.]").
145 In Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1989), the
court listed a number of facts that other courts have looked to to analyze the element of
unwelcomeness:
a) Whether plaintiff by her own conduct indicated that the alleged sexual
advances were unwelcome.
b) Whether the plaintiff substantially contributed to the alleged distaste-
ful atmosphere by her own "profane and sexually suggestive conduct."
c) Whether the plaintiff in response to evidence that at various times she
had willingly participated in the conduct now complained of can "identify
with some precision a point at which she made known to her co-workers
or supervisors that such conduct would hencefore [sic] be considered
offensive."
d) Whether and, if so, when, plaintiff reported or complained about any
of the incidents at issue.
e) Whether plaintiff's account of the "unwelcome" sexual conduct is suf-
ficiently detailed and internally consistent so as to be plausible.
f) The nature of the work environment itself.
Id. at 1499 (citations omitted).
146 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1991).
147 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
148 Id. at 69 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
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EEOC's "totality of the circumstances" test.1 49 Perhaps the strong-
est acceptance of the test is seen in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining.'150 In
Rabidue, the plaintiff alleged that exposure to degrading speech and
pornographic pictures subjected her to a hostile environment.1 51
Ultimately rejecting the plaintiff's claim, 152 the court listed several
factors relevant to determining whether such conduct was welcome:
the nature of the alleged harassment, the background and experi-
ence of the plaintiff, her coworkers and supervisors, the totality of
the environment of the plaintiff's work area, the lexicon of obscenity
that pervaded the environment of the workplace both before and
after the plaintiff's introduction into its environs, coupled with
the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily enter-
ing that environment.'
53
While the court stated that "the plaintiff must ... prove.., she
had been subjected to unwelcomed verbal conduct and poster dis-
plays of a sexual nature,"' 54 it did not explicitly discuss whether
such conduct was welcome. Instead, the court determined that the
alleged harassment was not "so startling" as to have affected the
psyche of the plaintiff.' 55 In reaching this conclusion, the court
pointed to societal norms. According to the court, the pornography
must be "considered in the context of a society that condones and
publicly features and commercially exploits open displays of written
and pictorial erotica .... ,"t56 Thus, under Rabidue, the totality of the
149 See supra note 46. Although the EEOC Guidelines are entitled to deference, they
are not binding. Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619
(6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
150 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
151 A co-worker continually referred to women as "whores," "cunt," "pussy," and
"tits," and to the plaintiff as a "bitch" and a "fat ass." Id. at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting)
Male employees "from time to time displayed pictures of nude or scantily clad women."
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 618. The court held that the sexually oriented posters could not
have a significant impact on the plaintiff's work environment due to the pervasiveness of
pornography in society. Id. at 622. In addition, even though the plaintiff was the only
female in management, she was excluded from important business lunches because "it
would be improper for a woman to take male customers to lunch." Rabidue, 805 F.2d at
624 (Keith, J. dissenting).
152 A few courts, however, have found a hostile work environment based on the
prevalence of pornography in the workplace. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that the pervasiveness of "pictures of
women in various stages of undress and in sexually suggestive or submissive poses"
created a hostile environment."); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569,
573 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the "proliferation of [pornography] may be found to
create an atmosphere in which women are viewed as men's sexual playthings rather than
as their equal co-workers.").
153 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (emphasis added).
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circumstances includes the level of discrimination and the accept-
ance of pornography in the world outside the workplace.
t 57
In Downes v. FAA,158 the Federal Circuit also adopted the total-
ity of the circumstances approach. Downes alleged sexual harass-
ment based on remarks relating to her body, physical touching of
her hair, and sexual remarks by supervisors directed at nonemploy-
ees. 159 Several of the alleged harassing remarks were made to
Downes by her supervisor during a phone conversation outside
work hours. 160 The court found there was not a specific pattern of
conduct. The court considered the time of day and the location of
the comments, and concluded that no hostile environment exis-
ted:161 "The important point is that the offensiveness of conduct
cannot be judged simply by proving that an incident involving sex-
ual remarks occurred without considering the context."' 62 In con-
sidering the context, the court implied that conduct that takes place
outside of the workplace is not harassment for Title VII
purposes.
t63
2. Criticism of the Test
Consideration of the entire context in which an event takes
place is often considered to be a major tenet of feminism. Professor
Carol Gilligan's work provides a starting point for this theory of
contextuality. t64 She argues that women focus on responsibility and
contextuality and men focus on separateness and rules.' 65 Thus,
women have a "different voice" than the dominant discourse. 166
Many feminists call for a broadening of legal analyses to include this
voice.
16 7
Professor Catharine MacKinnon rejects this concept. Accord-
ing to MacKinnon, the "different voice" that women possess is one
157 But see American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985)
(wherein Judge Easterbrook asserts that there is a causal relationship between pornogra-
phy and the lower pay and subordination of women), aff'd Hudnut v. American Book-
sellers Ass'n, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
158 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
159 Id. at 289.
160 Id
161 Id. at 295.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 GILLIGAN, supra note 19, at 29.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3
(1988); Naomi Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman in Theory and
in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1434-38 (1992) (advocating a "new contextual"
standard in place of the "reasonable woman standard").
1580 [Vol. 77:1558
THE "UNWELCOME" REQUIREMENT
that men allow them to possess. 168 The "different voice" concept
gives a positive valuation to women's attitudes "by making it seem
as though... [they] really are somehow ours, rather than what male
supremacy has attributed to us for its own use." 169 Thus, the "dif-
ferent" voice is a voice strangled out of a woman with a foot on her
neck.' 70 Under the "different voice" analysis, a broadening of fac-
tors considered in sexual harassment claims could include factors
that do not truly reflect women's experience. Such an expansion
carries the danger of sexist bias.
The factors listed by the Rabidue court demonstrate this dan-
ger.17 ' "The background and experience of the plaintiff"172 should
not be relevant to determine whether an advance or sexual ban-
tering was welcome. Even assuming the perspective of the harasser
as the Rabidue court did, there are several reasons to ignore such
evidence. First, background and experience may be unknown to the
harasser or to coworkers. Second, background and experience (in
Rabidue, an "irascible" personality) do not suggest a desire for por-
nographic displays or sexually degrading comments. Such consider-
ations invite courts and juries to use pejorative notions of "loose
women" when considering a meritorious claim.
In addition, using society as a yardstick in order to measure the
offensiveness of conduct within the workplace stagnates Title VII. 17
Simply because society may create a "hostile living environment," it
does not follow that the conduct is any less offensive or discrimina-
tory.' 74 Tide VII was enacted not to require the workplace to keep
168 CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Diference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,
supra note 22, at 32, 38-39.
169 Id. at 39.
170 "Take your foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue women speak."
Id at 45.
171 For example, the court considered as a factor "the reasonable expectation of the
plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that environment." Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th
Cir. 1986). Under this theory, if a woman entering into a male dominated workplace
realized she might encounter sexist behavior, a "reasonable expectation," the court
could deny a sexual harassment claim. The pre-existence of sexism of the workplace is
used in this way to deny redress for that very same sexism. See Rhodes, supra note 61 for
a discussion of the double standard between sexual harassment cases and racial harass-
ment cases. Courts do not use the existence of racism to deny redress for racist
behavior.
172 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
173 Although the presence of discrimination has dramatically decreased, today's cul-
ture is not bias free. The widespread instances of rape, harassment and other discrimi-
natory acts blatantly prove the continued presence of gender discrimination. The
widepsread existence of discriminatory attitudes should not be allowed to limit the re-
covery of harassment victims.
174 The use of society as a measure is not sanctioned in other hostile environment
cases, such as race, where racial slurs are assumed to serve no purpose. See Rhodes,
supra note 61.
1992] 1581
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
pace with society, but rather to prohibit "employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender, and... to remove arbitrary barriers to
sexual equality at the workplace . ." -175 The fact that discrimina-
tion exists in society does not make its existence in the workplace
acceptable.
Considering potentially biased factors has led courts to de-
emphasize other relevant factors. The Downes court found phone
conversations to be less harassing than face-to-face conversa-
tions. 176 The court also found that the remarks did not constitute
harassment because the conversation took place after hours.1 77
However, the remarks were still made within the unequal relation-
ship of supervisor and employee. ' 78 Conduct on the part of a super-
visor is no less harassing when it occurs outside the workplace than
within the workplace.17 9 With the inclusion of societal discrimina-
tion and the minimization of relevant interactions outside the work-
place, Downes demonstrates the inability of the "totality of the
circumstances" test to assess "unwelcomeness."
B. Did the Employee Incite or Solicit the Conduct Through
Her Dress, Actions, or Personality?
1. Origin and Judicial Interpretations of the Test
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court stated that
"[a] complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is [not] ir-
relevant in determining whether he or she found particular sexual
advances unwelcome."' 180 The Henson court stated that conduct
would be considered unwelcome if the employee did not solicit or
incite the alleged behavior "in the sense that the employee regarded
the conduct as undesirable or offensive."''1 In light of these hold-
175 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982).
176 775 F.2d 288, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
177 Id.
178 See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (discussing the power relationships
of the workplace).
179 See Haehn v. City of Hoisington, 702 F. Supp. 1526 (D. Kan. 1988). The court
held that a court may properly consider allegations of sexual conduct occurring after
work hours when deciding a summary judgment motion since "this conduct has an evi-
dentiary nexus to the work environment." Id. at 1529.
Recognizing this fact does not require Title VII to police every aspect of the
employer-employee relationship. However, when an employee's work environment is
made more difficult by the employer's behavior, the primary arena of the behavior
should not function as a method of excluding such evidence.
180 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986). The Supreme Court found
evidence of the plaintiff's speech and dress "obviously relevant" to the issue of wel-
comeness. Menitor, 477 U.S. at 69. The Court left any questions of balancing the preju-
dicial effect of such evidence against its relevance to the District Court, id., and simply
added that "there is no per se rule against its admissibility." Id.
181 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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ings, courts now examine the plaintiff's dress and personality when
adjudicating sexual harassment cases.
In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,' 8 2 the court found no hostile
environment even though the plaintiff was subjected to degrading
language and sexually explicit posters.t8 3 The court began its opin-
ion with a list of adjectives, mostly negative, describing the plain-
tiff's personality: "capable, independent, ambitious, aggressive,
intractable .... opinionated[,] ... abrasive, rude, antagonistic, ex-
tremely willful, uncooperative and irascible .... ,,184 The court then
dismissed the claim, finding that the conduct at issue did not consti-
tute behavior so shocking as to interfere with a reasonable person's
work situation.18 5 The court explicitly connected the plaintiff's per-
sonality with the likelihood of her taking offense at the crude lan-
guage: "Thus, the presence of actionable sexual harassment would
be different depending on the personality of the plaintiff . "... ,t86
Implicit in the court's opinion is the belief that a reasonable woman
should not behave in such a way. The court thus implied that the
plaintiff's personality justified the behavior of the harasser.18 7
The relationship between the plaintiff's behavior and the "wel-
comeness" issue was recognized in Swentek v. USAir, Inc. 188 Swentek,
a flight attendant, was subjected to numerous sexual advances and
comments by an airline pilot.'8 9 The employer defended the claim
by asserting that the plaintiff was a "foul-mouthed individual who
often talked about sex,"190 and that her past actions indicated that
the alleged sexual harassment was welcomed. 19' The trial court
found that "Swentek's own past conduct and use of foul language
meant that [the harasser's] comments were 'not unwelcome' even
though she told [the pilot] to leave her alone."' 1 2 Therefore,
Swentek's sexually explicit behavior with some individuals led the
182 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
183 See supra note 151 (discussing the alleged harassment).
184 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615.
185 In dismissing the claim, the court was apparently applying an objective test,
which is demonstrated by the use of the "reasonable person."
186 Id. at 620.
187 While this connection between personality and likelihood of offense is not per se
unreasonable, it is a broad generalization. Such generalizations have no place in an
adjudication of a victim's civil rights.
188 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
189 Swentek alleged that the pilot exposed himself by dropping his trousers, reached
under her skirt and grabbed her genitals, dropped to his knees and sniffed her, and
made numerous obscene comments. Id. at 555.
190 Id. at 556.
191 There was testimony that the plaintiff "placed a 'dildo' in her supervisor's
mailbox to get her to 'loosen up,' urinated in a cup and passed it as a drink to another
employee, and once grabbed the genitals of pilot Don Matthews with a frank invitation
to a sexual encounter." Id.
192 Id. at 557.
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court to infer that she desired this type of interaction with
everyone. 19
3
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding the trial court's
reliance on the plaintiff's personality traits erroneous.' 94 The cir-
cuit court held that where the alleged harasser was not exposed to
the plaintiff's past conduct, such conduct could not form a basis for
waiving legal protection against unwelcome harassment. 195 Hence,
the Fourth Circuit focused on the action from the harasser's per-
spective and implied that if the alleged harasser had been exposed
to the plaintiff's past conduct, such conduct would have been rele-
vant to the issue of "welcomeness."
Similarly, in Mitchell v. Hutchings,196 the defendant employer
sought to depose individuals who would testify that the plaintiffs
were "sexually promiscuous" and therefore "would not be as dis-
tressed by unwanted sexual advances as would plaintiffs who are less
sexually active."19 7 The Mitchell court, essentially utilizing the
Swentek rationale, held that "evidence relating to the work environ-
ment ... is obviously relevant, if such conduct was known to [the]
defendant .... -"198 The court did not allow the use of evidence re-
garding sexual activity unknown to the defendant' 99 or that was "re-
mote in time or place to the plaintiffs' working environment. ' 20 0
Thus, the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's prior conduct
with other individuals, as well as evidence of the work environment,
may be relevant in sexual harassment cases.
193 This inference is similar to one drawn in rape cases. Until recently, evidence of a
rape victim's prior sexual conduct was admissible to show consent. "[N]o impartial
mind can resist the conclusion that a female who had been in the recent habit of illicit
intercourse with others will not be so likely to resist as one spotless and pure." EsTRIm,
supra note 127, at 47 (quoting Lee v. State, 179 S.W. 145 (Tenn. 1915)).
194 The Swentek court excluded evidence of the plaintiff's speech. The court distin-
guished Meritor on the basis of frequency of contact between the plaintiff and her super-
visor. Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557. In Meritor, "[the plaintiff] worked with her supervisor
daily, and her dress and conversation were relevant in determining whether she wel-
comed sexual advances from him." Id The speech at issue in the Swentek case was not
conversations between the alleged harasser and the plaintiff. Rather, the conversations
involved the plaintiff and third parties to the case. The Swentek court found that "there
was no evidence... that [the employee] knew of [the plaintiff's] past conduct or that he
believed his conduct was welcomed by her." Id. Thus, the harasser must be exposed to
the plaintiff's speech in order for such evidence to be relevant.
195 Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir.
1983)).
196 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987).
197 Id. at 483. Evidence of the sexual atmosphere of the workplace was also sought
to show that the defendant's conduct was welcome. Id.




2. Criticism of the Test
Like Meritor, the Swentek decision offers great promise of equal-
ity and freedom from sexual harassment. Swentek endorses the Mer-
itor rationale for considering dress and speech, but Swentek does not
allow general evidence of past conduct to vitiate a plaintiff's sexual
harassment claim. While the court did not completely exclude evi-
dence of past conduct from the determination of welcomeness, it
did enunciate some limitations on the production and use of such
evidence.
Despite Swentek's partial limitation on evidence of the plaintiff's
past conduct, courts hearing sexual harassment claims continue to
impart male-biased perspectives to their analysis of "welcomeness."
For instance, courts have admitted evidence of dress and speech as
relevant to the issue of welcomeness. 20 1 Under the Meritor test, evi-
dence of a woman's dress may be admitted to show the harasser was
"incited" to the conduct. 202 The belief that such evidence is proba-
tive of a woman's intent displays the sexism inherent in such a
concept.
The belief that women signal our general availability by choice of
clothing or that our sexual sharing with some signifies sexual
availability to all is the purest male mythology, an insistence that
the male viewpoint is the only valid viewpoint. 20 3
The notion that women dress nicely to please men or to invite sex-
ual conduct permeates the test of unwelcomeness. Further, these
standards are riddled with sexist assumptions of what exactly an in-
vitation for sexual behavior entails.
The concept of women dressing to please men is obsolete and
incorrect. First, definitions of "sexually enticing" clothing are sub-
jective. What a man views as "enticing" may not be considered so
by the wearer of the garment. Sexual attraction and desire do not
rule everyone's daily decisions. Second, a woman may dress nicely
to bolster her own self-esteem, rather than to attract the attention of
others. 20 4 Society does not, nor should it, require women to dress
like nuns in order to avoid sending unknown and unintended
messages. Finally, a woman may dress in order to look attractive to
201 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Swentek v. US Air, Inc., 830
F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
202 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
203 Christine A. Littleton, FeministJurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 751, 770 (1989) (citations omitted) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED (1986)).
204 It is obvious that at times men and women do dress and behave in a manner
calculated to attract the attention of others. "Pick-up" joints are a clear example of an
arena for such behavior. However, to impute behavior that is acceptable in a social set-
ting to behavior in the workplace is unfounded.
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someone. Because a woman is attempting to attract one individual,
however, does not mean that she welcomes sexual attention from all
men. These and other explanations for a woman's particular style
of dress require courts to reject the automatic admittance of such
evidence. 2
05
Dress is not the only element courts consider when deciding
"welcomeness." A victim's personality must be pristine enough to
demonstrate that she did not invite the harassment. When courts
engage in this inquiry, the plaintiff's personality is put on trial.
20 6
The Swentek decision clearly limits the admissibility of the plaintiff's
personality or past conduct. This standard correctly protects the
rights of the plaintiff by limiting inquiries into her personality. Sex-
ual harassment law should not protect only those women whose per-
sonalities and characteristics the court holds above reproach.20 7 A
woman's "use of foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual
setting does not waive 'her legal protections against unwelcome
harassment.' "208
Unless her actions or dress clearly indicate a desire for sexual
conduct with the alleged harasser, there is no basis for believing that
a woman's desire to engage in sexual conduct with a specific person is
indicated by her dress or general speech. 20 9 By focusing on a
woman's dress and personality, current Title VII analysis puts the
plaintiff on trial. Sexual harassment plaintiffs must endure irrele-
vant inquiries into their personal lifestyle choices. Such inquiries
are a disincentive to bring sexual harassment suits. 2 1 0 In order to
205 Cases could exist where such evidence would be admitted. If a woman specifi-
cally focused her behavior towards the alleged harasser, such evidence should be admit-
ted. This determination should be made out of the hearing of the jury. See infra part
VIII (discussing solutions).
206 "Through emphasizing the plaintiff's 'abrasiveness' and minimizing the harmful-
ness of the harasser's conduct, the [Rabidue] court subtly suggested that something was
wrong with Rabidue for having been offended by [the alleged harasser's] behavior."
Ruth Colker, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Har-
assment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1199 (1990).
207 By examining the plaintiff's personality, a court may hold the plaintiff to a stere-
otyped notion of the appropriate characteristics for a women. In 1989, the Supreme
Court found that the use of stereotypes by supervisors to evaluate female employees for
promotions violates Title VII. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51
(1989). It naturally follows that the courts may not use gender stereotypes to evaluate
Title VII plaintiffs.
208 Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir.
1983)).
209 See infra part VI.B. While speech such as double entendres create a more difficult
situation, it should not be admitted as relevant. What one person views as a double
entendre, and therefore an invitation to engage in sexual conduct, may not be intended
as such by the speaker. Thus, to be admissible, speech should be clear as to its meaning
and audience.
210 "Most victims of sexual harassment . . . never file complaints." MACKINNON,
supra note 22, at 114. "[R]esearch has shown that very few individuals report their ex-
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achieve its potential for equality, Title VII analysis must focus on
the defendant's actions, not the plaintiff's.
VII
SOLUTIONS
Each of the judicial tests for "unwelcomeness" incorporates
sexist stereotypes and beliefs. Under each test,211 the court exam-
ines a woman's behavior to determine whether she "welcomed" the
sexual conduct in question. The danger lies in the factors courts
use to make this determination. Currently, courts examine the vic-
tim's speech, dress, personality, and prior behavior to determine
whether the alleged harassment was welcome. These factors put the
plaintiff's behavior on trial, invoke outdated stereotypes, and stag-
nate Title VII.
A. The Problem Redefined
Professor Catharine MacKinnon 21 2 states that women work cat-
egorically "as women."21 3 They are perceived in the workplace in
relation to their gender roles within society as a whole: hence, men
perceive women not as workers, but as sexual beings in the work-
place.2 14 When denied desired sexual relations, men sexually harass
women through degrading comments and behavior. 215 According
to this view, men in positions of power combine their authority as
supervisors with their perception of women as sexual beings. This
perception creates an environment that often leads to sexual
harassment. 21 6
Most of society agrees that a racially hostile environment will
never be welcomed by a victim, and that racial prejudice is never
consensual. Yet, in the area of sexual harassment, the line is
blurred2 17 because it is possible that coworkers will want to engage
periences or lodge an official complaint." Linda Brooks & Annette R. Perot, Reporting
Sexual Harassment: Exploring a Predictive Model, 15 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 31, 32 (1991).
211 See supra part VI (discussing the two tests).
212 Professor MacKinnon is the most influential scholar on the causes, effects and
legal aspects of the sexual harassment of women. Two of the seminal cases on hostile
environment analysis cited Professor MacKinnon to explain the difference between hos-
tile environment and quid pro quo harassment. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 908 n.18 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945-46 (D.C. Cir.
1981).




217 This appeal requires us to examine the often-blurred line which exists
between human interaction in the workplace which is purely a private
matter and human interaction in the workplace which gives rise to sexual
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in sexual relations or discuss topics that are sexual. 218 Two co-
workers who voluntarily engage in flirting do not violate Title VII.
However, if one co-worker or supervisor flirts with an employee who
does not want to engage in such conduct, a case of sexual harass-
ment arises. The problem is one of proof, and courts must deter-
mine whether the employee bringing a case truly welcomed such
behavior or was merely protecting her job.
219
The current definitions of "unwelcomeness"-the totality of
the circumstances and incitement/solicitation-demonstrate the
prominence of sexism and its inability to provide a workplace free of
sexual harassment. Under both tests, men's beliefs about women's
behavior provide the framework for Title VII cases. These defini-
tions must change in order to revitalize Title VII and enable its
promise of equality.
It is difficult to transform legal analysis in the way that feminist
scholars believe is necessary to protect the rights of women. 220 Like
the workplace, the legal system was structured by and for men.
22'
But until all courts reject the present system of analysis, the judici-
ary should begin reform by recognizing and removing sexist as-
sumptions from existing evidentiary rules.
B. The Irrelevance of the Victim's Speech and Dress
The Federal Rules of Evidence grant wide discretion to trial
judges in determining the admissibility of evidence,222 and the ex-
tent of this discretion is unlikely to change in the near future. How-
harassment claim actionable under either Title VII or the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir. 1990).
218 Sexual harassment is a violation only if the conduct is nonconsensual. The diffi-
culties in defining sexually harassive behavior parallel those in rape cases, i.e., inter-
course is only a crime if there is an absence of consent. See supra note 119.
219 See Shaney, supra note 128 (advocating a standard to examine if consent is freely
given).
220 Many of the previously cited articles advocate various new standards that would
incorporate women's views. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 13 (suggesting a standard that
uses the devaluation of women to judge Title VII violations).
221 "Men have constructed an adversary system, with its competitive, sparring style,
for the resolution of legal problems .... Because our legal system has developed from
an unstated male norm, it has never focused adequately on harms to women." Bender,
supra note 167, at 3, 7-8. This theme runs through many feminist articles. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985); Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3
HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 83 (1980); Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An
Essay, 95 YALE LJ. 1373 (1986).
222 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "all relevant evidence is admissible." FED.
R. EvID. 402. Evidence is considered relevant if it "has any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable." FED. R. EVID. 401. The "any tendency" test is not a difficult
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ever, an understanding of outdated stereotypes will decrease the
admission of prejudicial evidence.
Certain evidence should never be relevant in sexual harassment
cases. Evidence of the plaintiff's speech, dress, personality, and ac-
tions has little probative value, while the resulting prejudice may be
great. Although there will be some cases in which behavior is rele-
vant,223 in most cases Rule 401 should bar such evidence does not
have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact ... more or
less probable." 224 Even in those cases where the court feels that
such evidence passes the Rule 401 threshold, the evidence may be
excluded under Rule 403.225 In sexual harassment cases, evidence
about the plaintiff's prior sexual conduct, speech, and dress may
confuse the jury. Such evidence may shift the jury's focus from the
defendant's behavior to that of the plaintiff. This shift in focus is
prejudicial, frequently outweighing any probative value the evi-
dence may have. Further, examining past conduct may invite juries
to punish women for past expressions of sexuality or to incorrectly
infer that sexual expression with one person invites sexual expres-
sion with all. Thus, under Rule 403, evidence of the plaintiff's be-
standard to meet. Thus, Rule 401 is generally considered an inclusionary rule under
which most evidence is admitted.
Rule 401, however, is only the beginning of the inquiry. Relevant evidence may be
excluded under Rule 403 if it is too prejudicial: "[E]vidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury .... Id. The advisory committee notes to Rule 403
define unfair prejudice as "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." FED. R. EvID. 402 advisory com-
mittee's notes.
Under the structure of the Rules, the trial judge must first decide if the evidence is
relevant under Rule 401. Then, if the judge determines the offered evidence is relevant,
the judge must decide if there is potential for undue prejudice. If there is such poten-
tial, the trial judge must balance the probative value of the evidence against its possible
prejudical effect. Much leeway is given to trial judges in balancing the two effects. A
failure to balance these issues is reversible error.
As with any balancing test, a fair degree of subjectivity is involved. In addition to
determining the probative and prejudicial value of the offered evidence, the trial judge
must also consider thepurpose for which the evidence is offered: "The probative value of
evidence cannot, of course, be assessed in a vacuum; the value must always be measured
in terms of the purpose for which the evidence was introduced." U.S. v. Robinson, 560
F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1997) (Oakes, J., dissenting). The structure of the Federal Rules
of Evidence provides the means for excluding prejudicial evidence at several points in
the decisionmaking process-the judge may determine that the evidence is not relevant,
the evidence is too prejudicial, or that the evidence is too prejudicial for the purpose for
which it is offered. In the final section of this Note, these rules are applied to the specific
context of sexual harassment cases.
223 For example, if a woman walked into her employer's office wearing a negligee
and threw herself on the desk, one would probably consider such evidence relevant to
show a welcoming attitude.
224 FED. R. EvID. 401.
225 The wording of Rule 403 is discretionary and cannot be said to "require" any-
thing. "[E]vidence may be excluded .. " FED. R. EvID. 403.
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havior should usually be excluded as prejudicial and misleading to
the jury. By so doing, the jury will remain focused on whether the
defendant harassed the plaintiff.2 26
While any evidence not pertinent to the specific claim may seem
facially irrelevant, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 401 state
that "background" evidence can be admitted as an aid to under-
standing.2 27 Thus, the "fact to which the evidence is directed need
not be in dispute." 228 In other words, prior behavior, speech, and
dress of the plaintiff might be considered helpful background facts.
This concept alone suggests that prior sexual conduct, whether spe-
cific sexual acts, speech or dress, might be admissible. Yet, while
such facts may aid in understanding the defendant's actions, in most
cases the prejudicial nature of these facts outweighs any benefit be-
cause the jury's attention will be shifted from the defendant to a
prejudicial and unwarranted examination of the plaintiff.
C. Only Evidence of Specific Interaction Between the
Employee and the Harasser Should be Admitted
The optimal solution to this infusion of sexist stereotypes is the
adoption of the victim's perspective as carried out by the Ellision v.
Brady decision. Such a perspective removes the impact of societal
views and rids hostile environment cases of the "unwelcome" re-
quirement. However, the adoption of this standard would require a
large shift for many courts. Generally, progress in this area has
been made in incremental steps. This Note proposes that federal
courts should adopt this standard in order to remove sexist bias in
hostile environment cases.
The Ellison standard serves two purposes. First, it provides a
method to reduce the scope of admissible evidence while operating
within the current requirement of "welcomeness." Second, it pro-
vides a screening device for sexist stereotypes by limiting admissible
evidence to interactions between the alleged harasser and the
plaintiff.
Only evidence of behavior on the part of the plaintiff that is
specifically directed to the alleged harasser should be admitted to
show the welcomeness of the conduct. The burden should be on
the defendant to show a "specific" relationship between himself and
the plaintiff in order to substantiate his claim that his conduct was
welcome. General behavior should not be admitted. For example,
evidence that a woman dresses in a sexually provocative manner
226 As previously stated, any provocative act on the part of the plaintiff could be
admitted, if shown to be specifically directed at the alleged harasser.




should not be admitted unless the harasser could show the plaintiff
specifically wore such clothes to let him know of her desire for a
sexual relationship. Similarly, the plaintiff's past conduct would be
inadmissible unless specifically directed at the harasser.
Furthermore, the workplace need not be a completely sterile
environment in which relations between men and women are non-
existent. A relationship between two workers, with sexual over-
tones, should not be evidence that a woman welcomes sexual
conduct from all workers. Simply because a woman wishes to ex-
press her sexuality with one person does not tend to show she
wishes such a relationship with all people. Hence, if the plaintiff
makes comments of a sexual nature in the workplace, they should
not be admitted unless they were directed at the defendant with a
clear purpose of inviting sexual relations or banter.229
At first glance, narrowing the realm of admissible evidence in
this manner may seem to contradict the general concept of inclusion
embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 230 However, Title VII
is not a "fault-based tort scheme." 23' Evidence that provides a
background of the defendant's intent is irrelevant under the statute.
Only evidence relating to the cause and effect of the conduct is pro-
bative to the issue. The defendant's belief that his conduct was wel-
come also should be irrelevant under Title VII. However, the
"unwelcome" requirement makes such intentions relevant. The
prejudice created by the pervasiveness of sexist norms and the lim-
ited relevance of the defendant's intentions provide a sound basis to
exclude such background evidence.
Under this approach, which excludes evidence of "general" be-
havior, the various factors listed by the Rabidue court (plaintiff's ex-
perience, the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the workplace, etc.)
would be inadmissible as general evidence. The focus would remain
on the specific relationship between the parties to the case, and past
experiences external to this relationship would not be considered.
A woman's reputation as "easy" is not a basis for finding that she
welcomed conduct from a specific person. Men do not and should
not assume that they are interchangeable with other men. Thus,
courts should not impute a woman's behavior with one man to all
229 "[There is) a tendency among men to perceive women's friendly behavior as a
sign of sexual interest or availability." Catherine B. Johnson et al., Persistence of Men's
Misperceptions of Friendly Cues Across A Variety of Interpersonal Encounters, 15 PSYCH. WOMEN
Q. 463, 464 (1991).
230 See FED. R. EVID. 401; FED. R. EvID. 402.
231 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454
F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)); see also Greene, supra
note 78, at 31 ("Title VII was aimed at the consequences of employment practices rather
than the motivation behind them.").
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other men. To do so would rid women of personal choice, identity,
and freedom. In sum, current tests of welcomeness admit too much
general evidence about the plaintiff, and hence limit Title VII.
CONCLUSION
For women to achieve equality in the workplace, new concep-
tions of discrimination must be adopted. Presently, to succeed on a
sexual harassment claim, a woman is required to prove that the con-
duct that was harassing and unwelcome. Courts must limit admis-
sion of evidence to the specific relationship between the defendant
and the plaintiff. Through this judicial limitation of admissible evi-
dence, women will be better able to define the offense committed
against them and secure legal redress. Further, employers will be
forced to view women as individual workers and not as a group
whose identity as workers and as women are inseparable.
Ann C. Julianot
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